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Quantum key distribution (QKD) is the best candidate for securing communications against attackers, who may in
the future exploit quantum-enhanced computational powers to break classical encryption. As such, new challenges are
arising from our need for large-scale deployment of QKD systems. In a realistic scenario, transmitting and receiving
devices from different vendors should be able to communicate with each other without the need for matching hardware.
Therefore, practical deployment of QKD would require hardware capable of adapting to different protocols and clock
rates. Here, we address this challenge by presenting a multi-rate, multi-protocol QKD transmitter linked to a corre-
spondingly adaptable QKD receiver. The flexibility of the transmitter, achieved by optical injection locking, allows us
to connect it with two receivers with inherently different clock rates. Furthermore, we demonstrate the multi-protocol
operation of our transmitter, communicating with receiving parties employing different decoding circuits.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows users to communicate
with information theoretical security [1]. It has become a strong
candidate to resolve the imminent threat posed by quantum com-
puters [2] to many existing cryptographic protocols based on
complexity theory [3]. QKD, on the other hand, bases its security
on the laws of quantum mechanics and would not be affected
by the advent of quantum computers. There have been many
impressive demonstrations of point-to-point QKD over fiber
links, including key sharing at 10 Mbit/s [4] and at a distance of
421 km [5] for a point-to-point link of optical fiber. Such distances
can be further improved due to the novel twin-field QKD protocol
[6], which has the capability to reach more than 500 km [7,8].
Large-scale implementations of QKD will likely see users hav-
ing different devices from different manufacturers. This calls for an
urgent need for interoperability. In a realistic scenario, users would
likely choose their device based on required performance and
system cost, where different vendors might offer devices operating
at different clock rates or via different protocols. [9] Much of the
current research within QKD aims at improving specific systems,
while little consideration is given to interoperability between
different systems. This has led to the situation where dedicated
hardware is required to implement separate protocols and to oper-
ate at a fixed clock rate. Multi-rate, multi-protocol capability of
the transmitters and receivers are hence highly desirable in this
scenario [10,11]. However, much of the research in this direction
has focussed solely on highlighting the flexibility of the transmitter
by implementing the protocols separately. In a scenario where com-
munication with several parties is required, being able to switch
between clock rates and protocols in real time is crucial for efficient
communication.
In this paper, we demonstrate real-time, multi-clock, and multi-
protocol continuous operation of a directly phase-modulated
QKD transmitter [12,13]. By changing only the driving signal
sent to our transmitter, we are able to change its operating regime
in real time to communicate with a different receiving device. The
system stabilization happens within a few seconds, without loss of
integrity or degradation of the quantum bit error rate (QBER) or
secure key rates (SKRs) afterwards.
2. EXPERIMENTAL REALIZATION
A. Protocols
We implement three QKD protocols. The first is the differential
phase shift (DPS) protocol [14]. This protocol is based on the
encoding of information in the phase difference of consecutive
pulses. Alice can encode her information with {0, π} phase shifts,
and Bob will decode it using an asymmetric Mach–Zehnder
interferometer (aMZI).
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The second protocol is the time-bin encoded BB84 protocol
[15] with decoy states [16–18]. Here, the information is carried
by the phase difference in pulse pairs. Pulses belonging to different
pairs need to have a random phase difference. Such randomness is
necessary to minimize the amount of information an eavesdropper
can retrieve from the pulse [19]. Alice encodes her qubits in two
different bases: for the X basis, phase shifts of {0, π} are used. For
the Y basis, phase shifts of {π/2, 3π/2} are used. The intensity
of the optical pulses is modulated to implement the decoy states
technique.
Finally, the last protocol we implement is the coherent one way
(COW) protocol [20]. The information is encoded in the time
bins of pulse pairs, the coherence between which is used to check
whether these pulses have been tampered with.
As a proof-of-principle demonstration, we consider the pro-
tocols’ asymptotic SKRs. A full finite-sized analysis is outside the
scope of the present paper and would not change the significance
of our results. Moreover, to simplify the data collection, data are
collected in one basis only for the BB84 protocol, with the assump-
tion that the two bases are chosen with identical probabilities and
have similar phase errors. Finally, since the data are recorded and
measured as a cumulative histogram of a repeating pattern, one
detector is sufficient to measure the QBER. This all means that we
need only one detector for the BB84 and DPS protocols and two
detectors for the COW protocol (one for the time-bin encoding,
one for decoy detection). This also means that the same receiver can
be used for all three protocols at a given clock rate. The input of the
chip is split between the straight waveguide and the interferometer,
with a ∼50 : 50 splitting ratio, which allows us to measure all the
quantities we need at once. While not the case in a realistic sce-
nario, this is reasonable for a proof-of-principle experiment, as we
are able to extract all the needed information from this simplified
setup.
It is important to note that security proofs for the three proto-
cols show that they have significant differences in their security. For
example, the decoy-state BB84 protocol is secure against coherent
attacks, whereas the security proofs for the DPS and COW proto-
cols are based on collective attacks. For this reason, the comparison
between the SKRs obtained with the BB84 [21], DPS [22], and
COW [23] protocols should take this into account.
B. Modulator-Free Transmitter
The encoding is based on the combination of two well-known
techniques in laser physics: optical injection locking (OIL) [24,25]
and direct phase modulation [26]. This approach has been proven
to effectively remove the need for a phase modulator in QKD
[12]: this makes our transmitter versatile while also reducing the
number of optical elements in the setup. Another advantage of our
transmitting setup is the lack of an aMZI. This is useful for two
main reasons: first of all, this greatly reduces losses since there is no
mismatch between two arms of different length. In a fiber-based
system, this does not have a big impact, but chip-based experi-
ments suffer from higher losses, hence a 500 ps or 1 ns delay line
would lead to a power mismatch between the two arms. For this
reason, chip-based experiments usually avoid embedding an aMZI
in the transmitter, resorting to modulating every pulse with a phase
modulator [11] or exploiting the directly phase-modulated setup
[13]. The second advantage of an aMZI-free setup is the ability to
use the same setup to encode different protocols. This is crucial to
our experiment, as it allows us to change different protocols and/or
clock rates at will by simply changing the modulation of the driving
current, with a transient of less than 5 s between every change.
The experimental setup is shown in Fig. 1. We use arbitrary
waveform generators (AWGs) with a sampling rate of 24 Gs/s and
vertical resolution of 8 bit to drive the lasers at gigahertz clock rates
and synchronize the system. A phase encoding laser injects light
into a second, injection locked laser through a circulator. These are
both discrete optics, off-the-shelf DFB lasers, with a bandwidth of
>10 GHz. An intensity modulator sets the signal and decoy levels
for the system. The quantum channel is simulated by a variable
optical attenuator (VOA), fiber-coupled to the transmitter and
the receiver. A micro-electromechanical system (MEMS) switch is
used to select the correct receiver chip, according to the driving sig-
nal sent to the transmitter setup. At the output of the receiver chips,
Fig. 1. Experimental setup used to carry out the experiment. DC and RF signals are combined through a bias-tee and sent to the phase encoding and
injection locked lasers. A circulator prevents light from the latter going back to the phase encoding laser. The RF signals are changed to encode different pro-
tocols and clock rates. An optical MEMS switch selects the correct receiver chip, which is out-coupled to SNSPDs.
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optical fibers are coupled to superconducting nanowire single pho-
ton detectors (SNSPDs) [27]; each of the outputs (the time-bin
encoding waveguide for COW and one of the interferometer out-
puts for all three protocols, as mentioned above) is connected to a
detector. The SNSPDs’ output is read by a single-photon counting
module (SPCM) that digitizes the data and sends the results to
Bob’s computer where the QBER and key rates are computed.
We encode our information as shown in Fig. 2. For the COW
and DPS protocol, the phase encoding laser is always biased over
its threshold to produce continuous-wave (CW) emission; addi-
tionally, in the DPS case, a small current modulation, synchronized
to the interval of two injection locked pulses, is applied when a
π phase modulation is required. The BB84 protocol requires, in
addition to the phase modulation, a random global phase: only
pulses belonging to the same pair of time bins have a set phase
difference. To this end, the phase encoding laser is driven periodi-
cally above and below the lasing threshold, exploiting the inherent
randomness of gain switching [28,29].
C. Integrated Receivers
The receivers are SiOxNy photonic chips, whose interferometer
lengths determine the clock rates they work at. We use receiver
chips whose interferometer delay lengths are 500 and 400 ps,
achieving clock rates of 2 and 2.5 GHz, respectively.
Our QKD receivers are manufactured on a silicon-based
substrate, which allows for low losses and easy integration. Our
receiver chips are designed to have different interferometers, each
one decoding information for a different protocol.
The interferometers are tuned by means of thermo-optic phase
shifters. Such elements can be driven with a DC current source; a
π phase shift is obtained with a voltage of around 15 V. The phase
shift induced by the heaters can be used to direct light towards one
arm or the other of the interferometer, or to balance the power
between the two arms. This is particularly important since the
long arm will cause a power imbalance at the output coupler: the
length of the delay line will cause more losses. For this experiment,
Fig. 2. Modulation signals driving signals from phase encoding and injection locked lasers for the COW, DPS, and BB84 protocols. For each protocol,
the top plot represents the electrical driving signals, and the bottom plot represents the optical output. The symbol between consecutive pulses represents
the relative phase difference, where “R” refers to a random phase difference between pulses.
Research Article Vol. 8, No. 6 / June 2021 / Optica 914
the total loss for the interferometer circuit on the 2.5 GHz chip is
measured to be 10.1 dB, while the loss for the 2 GHz chip is 6.7 dB.
The straight waveguides used for the COW protocol have losses
that are ∼3 dB less than the interferometer ones.
The main contribution to the losses is the propagation loss
(∼0.2 dB/cm) in the delay line; however, a big contribution also
comes from fabrication imperfections and fiber coupling. All these
cause the excess loss in the 2.5 GHz chip compared to the 2 GHz
chip, as the statistical imperfections of that chip cause losses that
overweigh the lower loss coming from the shorter delay line.
The output waveguides are out-coupled through optical fibers
to SNSPDs, with an efficiency of 44% and dark count rates of
∼10 Hz.
3. RESULTS
Figure 3 shows the performance of the transmitter at two different
clock rates using the BB84 protocol. The loss considered in the
plots includes only the quantum channel attenuation and the
loss from the optical switch. As shown in the figure, the 2.5 GHz
performs worse than the 2 GHz receiver at the same channel loss.
This is due to the excess losses in the chip mentioned above. The
top axis in Fig. 3 shows instead the total loss, including the receiver
chip loss. This allows a clearer comparison between the chips, and
shows how the higher clock rate would indeed yield a higher key
rate as expected, if the chips had equal loss.
We then proceed to the main goal of the paper, demonstrating
the flexibility of our system. Our transmitter is set to implement
different protocols at different clock rates. A signal is then sent
to the system, triggering the clock rate and protocol change after
10 min. When this happens, a first point is recorded with a high
QBER and, consequently, no positive key rate. The main reason
behind this is that the AWG’s electronics takes some time to settle
to a stable output. This time is below 5 s. Results are shown in
Fig. 4. The stability of the system allows for a reasonably constant
SKR during a 10 min time window, at a channel loss of 14 dB.
The QBER is stable around values of 2.7% for BB84 at both
clock rates and DPS, while it is around 0.7% for the COW proto-
col, due to the absence of phase errors in this protocol. This yields
key rates of 0.5, 0.4, and 2.5 Mbps for BB84, DPS, and COW,
respectively.
Fig. 3. BB84 secure key rates and QBER versus channel loss for 2 and 2.5 GHz. The color red indicates the QBER, teal the raw count rates, and orange
the SKR. The points correspond to measured data, the line to the simulated behavior.
Fig. 4. Performance of the universal transmitter results obtained encoding the BB84 protocol at different clock rates (left) and encoding different proto-
cols at a 2 GHz rate (right). The first point after every change of clock rate or protocol, with a high QBER, does not result in a positive SKR. The data are
collected at a channel loss of 14 dB. The 2.5 GHz regime has lower count rates than the 2 GHz regime due to the higher losses in the receiver chip.
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4. CONCLUSION
Our experiments show the feasibility of having a single transmitter
communicating with receivers employing different clock rates and
protocols. This is possible because of the directly phase-modulated
setup that allows flexibility to change the operating conditions by
simply modifying the electrical driving signals. The protocols and
clock rates are set up to continuously change, leading to the system
reconfiguring in real time while still maintaining a low QBER and
high SKR. We showed an effective setup time lower than 5 s. This
was limited by the driving electronics, mainly the AWG, needing
time to settle to the desired operation regime. Reduced times can be
certainly obtained by using faster driving electronics, for instance,
a custom-designed field programmable gate array (FPGA) board.
On the receiver side, two different chips were used for the two
different clock rates. Tuneable delay length can be considered to
demonstrate multi-rate capabilities of the receiver; however, it
must be noted that adding reconfigurable components would
add to the complexity of the chip and could cause issues such as
thermal fluctuations. An alternative approach, since the advantage
of integrated photonics lies in the compactness of devices, might be
to implement different interferometers on the same chip.
Our result is a step forward towards interoperability between
devices from different vendors and paves the way for large-scale,
collaborative deployment of QKD systems. In this respect, we
believe that our work will have a positive impact on the on-going
efforts in QKD standardization.
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